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### SELF-CRITICISM OF GDR REICHSBAHN MANAGEMENT

[Comment: The following information has been extracted from an article appearing in the Taegliche Rundschau of 12 December 1952. The article, signed by Staimer (fnu), Deputy Director General of the Reichsbahn, was entitled "Critical Remarks Regarding the Fulfillment of the Reichsbahn Investment Plan." The article is of particular interest because of the purported present reorganization of the Reichsbahn and the open admission on the part of a high Reichsbahn official to so many serious shortcomings.]

As of September 1952, the RBDs (Reichsbahn Directorates) Cottbus, Berlin, and Dresden had fulfilled their 1952 investment plans by only 23, 31, and 39 percent, respectively. A closer analysis of these figures reveals that the most important and extensive projects of all RBDs are far behind the planned figures. This poor performance represents economic damage to the Reichsbahn, expressed not only in reduced income but also in increased expenses, because the lagging construction of second tracks and new lines and the lack of technical equipment reduce efficiency and, as a result, retard increased productivity.

Despite difficulties with materials procurement, the cause for nonfulfillment may be traced primarily to a poor sense of responsibility on the part of many executives. Presidents Max Barth of the RBD Berlin, Gruber (fnu) of the RBD Cottbus, and Gottschalk (fnu) of the RBD Dresden were not sufficiently familiar with the fulfillment status of their investment projects. The areas mentioned above fulfill their construction program poorly because they lack operational leadership.

A critical materials shortage only aggravates this laissez-faire attitude. No long-range plans were prepared for the work of the various specialized departments. Operational errors in the track system were not discovered until the construction stage.

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The fact that the construction department of the Directorate General of the Reichsbahn did not carry on the necessary maintenance of the existing track structures may be considered a particular weakness of the executive personnel. Wunsch (fnu), department chief, was not able to assure the continued maintenance of existing track structures under the pressure of directing the completion of the necessary investment projects. Nor was he able to perform this construction work on a priority basis. Instead, he started all projects at the same time and thus wasted the labor force.

The materials shortage of the Reichsbahn is not only to be blamed on the State Administration for Supply but also on the lack of initiative of employees of departments IX/X /Supply and Procurement/ of the Directorate General of the Reichsbahn and of the REDs. An opportunistic attitude was demonstrated in the procurement of ties. Contracts were not concluded on time nor followed up with sufficient emphasis. The custom of accepting verbal commitments from the State Administration for Supply, which has led to serious delays of materials procurement, is to be deplored.

An indication of the prevalent carelessness is the receipt by the Directorate General of 202 requests for investment-plan changes as of 20 September 1952.

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